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The rationalistic theories of morality emphasize that reasoning plays an important role in
moral judgments and prosocial behavior. Theory of mind as a reasoning ability in the
mental domain has been considered a facilitator of moral development. The present
study examined whether theory of mind was consistently positively associated with
morality from middle childhood to late adulthood. Two hundred and four participants,
including 48 elementary school children, 45 adolescents, 62 younger adults, and 49
older adults, completed theory of mind, moral judgment and prosocial behavior tasks.
Theory of mind was measured with strange stories that tapped into an understanding of
lies, white lies, double bluffs, irony, and persuasion. Moral judgments were measured with
variants of the trolley dilemma. Prosocial behavior was measured through participants’
performance in an interactive situation in which a helping request was made. The results
indicated specific rather than similar developmental trajectories of theory of mind, moral
judgments, and prosocial behavior. There was a quadratic trend in theory of mind, a
combination of quadratic and cubic trends in deontological moral judgments and a linear
decline in helping behavior. It is thus suggested that theory of mindmay not be associated
with morality in an unchanging way during development. Further results indicated that
theory of mind and deontological moral judgments were negatively correlated for children,
adolescents, and older adults but positively correlated for younger adults. Theory of mind
and helping behavior were positively correlated for children but negatively correlated for
adolescents. However, the relationships disappeared in adulthood. In sum, the present
study reveals that theory of mind may be a nice tool for its facilitation of deontological
moral judgments and prosocial behavior, but it may also be a nasty tool for its blocking of
deontological moral judgments and prosocial behavior. Moreover, theory of mind may be
a permanent tool for moral judgment development but a temporary tool for prosocial
behavior development. Thus, the present study enriches the rationalistic theories of
morality from a developmental perspective. Different relationships between theory of
mind and morality from middle childhood to late adulthood are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
A person with moral judgments and behavior is respectable. He
or she can make moral judgments between right and wrong and
display prosocial behavior when confronting moral situations.
Individuals’ moral development is important for their normal
social interaction. Studies indicate that moral development is
positively related to popularity and reputation within one’s peer
group in early developmental stages (Peterson and Siegal, 2002;
Wardle et al., 2011).
Moral development may especially require mental state
reasoning, i.e., theory of mind (Premack and Woodruff, 1978).
For example, when an individual infers others’ intentions and
beliefs behind their actions, he or she is more likely to make
impartial moral judgments about those actions. Additionally,
understanding others’ desires and emotions may facilitate
prosocial behavior toward others. It is thus suggested that
theory of mind helps moral development. However, Happé
and Frith (1996) found that children with conduct disorder
passed standard theory of mind tasks, i.e., false belief tasks but
were rated as having significant antisocial behavior. Therefore,
nice and nasty theory of mind are differentiated (Happé and
Frith, 1996; Ronald et al., 2005). According to this theory, both
specific prosocial behavior (e.g., helping behavior) and antisocial
behavior (e.g., lying behavior) necessitate mental state reasoning.
In other words, individuals with advanced theory of mind may
not always behave prosocially.
Previous studies have examined the relationships between
theory of mind and morality. With regard to moral judgments,
some studies have investigated the relationship between
preschoolers’ theory of mind and moral judgments. Lane
et al. (2010) found that preschoolers’ false belief understanding
positively predicted their psychological-needs reasoning inmoral
judgments. Smetana et al. (2012) reported that preschoolers’
performance on theory of mind tasks assessing belief, desire,
and belief-emotion relationship understanding had both positive
and negative influences on their moral judgments on moral
transgressions in terms of rule independence during different
developmental intervals. Adult social neuroscience studies have
confirmed that moral judgments recruited several brain regions
relating to theory of mind, such as the right temporo-parietal
junction (Bzdok et al., 2012; Young and Dungan, 2012). This
region is responsible for reasoning about cognitive mental
states such as beliefs and intentions (Young and Dungan, 2012).
Higher activity in the right temporo-parietal junction has been
found to be related to more lenient moral judgments regarding
accidental harm (Young and Saxe, 2009). Researchers have
made a distinction between cognitive and affective theory of
mind (Abu-Akel and Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Wang and Su,
2013). Cognitive theory of mind involves understanding of
beliefs and intentions, whereas affective theory of mind involves
understanding of emotions and feelings. According to this
differentiation, previous studies indicate that understanding of
cognitive mental states seems to be related to moral judgments
across each developmental stage. However, the developmental
changes in the relationships between understanding of cognitive
mental states and moral judgments are still not clear.
Many studies have investigated the relationships between
theory of mind and morals-related behavior. During preschool
years, children’s overall performance on cognitive and affective
theory of mind tasks and their false belief understanding have
been positively related to their prosocial behavior (Moore et al.,
1998; Caputi et al., 2012; Yagmurlu, 2014). Using the DG and UG
games, false belief understanding, cognitive perspective-taking,
and emotion attribution to self have also been found to be
positively associated with allocations in the games (Gummerum
et al., 2010; Takagishi et al., 2010, 2014). Limited studies show that
children who pass false belief tasks allocate less than those who
fail (Cowell et al., 2015). When children enter elementary school,
their overall performance on cognitive and affective theory
of mind tasks continues to positively predict their prosocial
behavior and negatively predict their bullying behavior (Caputi
et al., 2012; Shakoor et al., 2012). A few studies have also indicated
that children who engage in specific antisocial behavior perform
as well on cognitive theory of mind tasks as prosocial children
(Gasser and Keller, 2009; Lonigro et al., 2014). Limited evidence
has been found for the relationships between theory of mind
and morals-related behavior during adolescence and adulthood.
One study indicated that intention and emotion understanding
were positive predictors of preadolescents’ prosocial behavior
(Cˇavojová et al., 2011). Thus, behavioral studies suggest that
understanding of both cognitive and affective mental states are
related to morals-related behavior. In addition, developmental
and adult social neuroscience studies have shed light on the role
of cognitive processes in morals-related behavior. Studies have
shown an association between children’s sharing behavior and
their differences in later waveforms (LPP; Cowell and Decety,
2015) and relationships between adults’ behavioral altruism and
their gray matter volume in the right temporo-parietal junction
(Morishima et al., 2012). In sum, previous studies have indicated
that theory of mind may be associated with moral judgments
across development, but how they are related during different
developmental stages needs to be further clarified. Furthermore,
theory of mind is beneficial to prosocial behavior in preschool
years. During middle childhood, theory of mind is generally
positively related to prosocial behavior even if some individuals
may use it to carry out antisocial behavior. The relationships
between theory of mind and prosocial behavior in adolescence
and adulthood are still not clear.
Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the relationships between
theory of mind and morality from middle childhood to
adulthood, and this clarification is theoretically important.
There has been a long debate on the roles of cognitive
and emotional processes in morality. Cognitive-developmental
theories emphasize that reasoning and reflection play a key
role in moral development (Piaget, 1965; Kohlberg, 1969).
Moral judgments in Kohlberg’s theory represent “underlying
thought organization rather than specific responses” (Nisan
and Kohlberg, 1982, p. 865), which indicates the importance
of reasoning in moral judgments. The social domain theory
(Turiel, 1983, 1998) also focuses on individuals’ understanding
and interpretations of social situations. It further makes a
distinction between understanding of events in the moral and
conventional domains. Moral transgressions are judged wrong
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 August 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1261
Hao and Liu Theory of Mind and Morality
regardless of explicit rules and authority (Turiel, 2008a). The
above theories represent the perspectives of rationalism that were
mentioned by Haidt (2012). However, the social intuitionalist
model emphasizes that moral judgments are driven by quick
processes of intuitions (Haidt, 2001, 2013). Moreover, emotion
is considered more influential in moral actions (Haidt, 2001).
Therefore, intuition and emotion play central roles in morality
according to the model. Recent neuroscience work has shown
that moral judgments involve the brain regions relating to theory
of mind and those related to emotional processes (Bzdok et al.,
2012; Young and Dungan, 2012). These findings provide neural
bases for the cognitive or emotional mechanisms of morality.
Thus, an association between theory of mind and morality will
provide evidence for the rationalistic perspective of morality.
Dissociation between them may suggest that morality depends
on other mechanisms.
Several issues need to be clarified regarding the relationships
between theory of mind and morality during development. First,
it is not clear whether the developmental trends in theory of
mind, moral judgments, and prosocial behavior are the same.
Previous studies show that theory of mind increases frommiddle
childhood to adolescence (Scheeren et al., 2013) and then declines
from early to late adulthood (e.g., Henry et al., 2013). It is thus
suggested that theory of mind may display an inverted U-shaped
developmental trend. However, the developmental trajectories of
moral judgments and prosocial behavior are not clear. According
to Kohlberg’s stages of moral judgments (Kohlberg, 1976), there
are qualitative changes in moral judgments from childhood
to adulthood. Thus, the developmental trajectory of moral
judgments may be sharper than that of theory of mind. Because
morals-related behavior is dissociated from moral judgments
to some extent (Janssens and Dekovic´, 1997; Derryberry and
Thoma, 2005; Gasser and Malti, 2012), they may have different
developmental trajectories. Therefore, it is hypothesized that
there are specific developmental trends in theory of mind, moral
judgments, and prosocial behavior. This hypothesis implies that
theory of mind may not be associated with morality in an
unchanging way during development. Second, developmental
relationships between theory of mind and moral judgments still
need to be clarified. According to Kohlberg’s (1969) cognitive-
developmental theory and findings of moral neuroscience (e.g.,
Blair et al., 2006; Young and Dungan, 2012), moral judgments
require conscious reasoning from childhood to adulthood. Thus,
it is hypothesized that theory of mind may continue to be
associated with moral judgments across development. Third,
it is important to further clarify the relationships between
theory of mind and prosocial behavior during development.
Previous studies have shown that theory of mind is generally
positively related to prosocial behavior in middle childhood
(e.g., Caputi et al., 2012). Thus, it is hypothesized that theory
of mind and prosocial behavior are positively associated in
middle childhood. However, as individuals enter adolescence,
more antisocial behavior emerges. For example, indirect bullying
is most common in adolescence (Vaillancourt, 2005). This form
of bullying in particular requires theory of mind (Sutton et al.,
1999). Thus, it is hypothesized that theory of mind may be
negatively related to prosocial behavior in adolescence. As for
younger and older adults, the relationships between theory of
mind and prosocial behavior are seldom reported. Previous
studies have shown that theory of mind develops quickly
during earlier developmental stages. Children and adolescents’
understanding of white lies, second-order false beliefs, double
bluffs, faux pas, and sarcasm increases with age (Broomfield
et al., 2002; Scheeren et al., 2013). Thus, individuals in earlier
developmental stages may use theory of mind more frequently
to solve moral problems than do adults. By contrast, intuition
and emotion are considered more influential on adults’ morality
(Haidt, 2001, 2013). Therefore, it is hypothesized that the link
between theory of mind and prosocial behavior may disappear
in adulthood.
The present study aimed at examining the relationships
between theory of mind and morality from middle childhood to
late adulthood. Elementary school children, adolescents, younger
adults, and older adults completed experimental tasks assessing
their theory of mind, moral judgments, and prosocial behavior.
Because individuals acquire basic theory of mind, such as false
belief understanding, in the preschool years, an advanced test of
theory of mind, strange story task (Happé, 1994) was used in the
present study. This task has been proved to be suitable for both
children and adults (Happé, 1994). In the present study, stories
involving a lie, a double bluff, persuasion, a white lie, and irony
were presented to the participants. According to previous studies,
the lie, double bluff and persuasion stories involve inference of
beliefs and intentions (Kemp et al., 2012; Wang and Su, 2013),
and thus assess cognitive mental state understanding, while the
white lie and irony stories involve reasoning about emotions and
feelings (Shamay-Tsoory andAharon-Peretz, 2007;Wang and Su,
2013), and thus measure affective mental state understanding. In
addition, previous studies have revealed age-related relationships
between theory of mind and morality to some extent. However,
inconsistent findings also exist. Different theory of mind tasks
measuring specific mental state understanding are used in
previous studies, which may be the cause of the inconsistencies.
Thus, it is necessary to use the strange story task measuring core
components of theory of mind to further clarify whether specific
mental state understanding is related to morality. Meanwhile, the
use of the same theory of mind task in all age groups helps rule
out the possibility that different relationships between theory of
mind and morality during different developmental stages stem
from different measures of theory of mind. Therefore, the strange
story task measuring core components of theory of mind, i.e.,
belief, intention, and emotion understanding was used in the
present study.
The trolley dilemma and its variants (Hauser et al., 2007) were
used to assess participants’ moral judgments. They involved a
classic trolley dilemma (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1985), a classic
footbridge dilemma (Thomson, 1986) and two trolley dilemmas
that were adapted from the classic one. In these moral dilemmas,
participants were asked to decide whether it was acceptable to
harm one person to save five people. There are several reasons
for the use of these trolley-like dilemmas as moral judgment
measures. First, the orientation of participants’ moral judgments
can be clearly identified. A choice to save five people indicates
a utilitarian moral judgment, whereas the choice to protect the
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innocent person indicates a deontological moral judgment. The
utilitarian principle emphasizes the maximization of the good for
most people (Mill, 1998). The deontological principle emphasizes
adherence to moral rules regardless of the consequences (Kant,
1959). Although individuals with utilitarian moral judgments
seem to attach great importance to the good for most people, it
may essentially reflect their consequence-basedmoral judgments.
In addition, Kahane et al. (2015) noted that utilitarian moral
judgments were not equal to “impartial concern for the greater
good (p. 193).” Studies on psychopathy provide further evidence
for the perspective. Psychopathy is characterized by severe
antisocial behavior (Hare and Neumann, 2008). Individuals
with more psychopathic traits prefer more utilitarian moral
judgments (Glenn et al., 2010; Bartels and Pizarro, 2011; Seara-
Cardoso et al., 2012). By contrast, deontological moral judgments
reflect adherence to moral rules regardless of the consequences
(Kant, 1959). Second, it is very important to rule out the
social desirability effect, especially in moral studies. Previous
studies have used some everyday situations to assess participants’
moral judgments (Carlo et al., 1996; Malti et al., 2009). For
example, participants were asked to decide whether to help an
injured child or to go to a party (Carlo et al., 1996). It is
very easy for them to give desirable answers to these familiar
situations because this type of moral knowledge can be easily
learned in everyday or didactic contexts. Although the trolley
dilemmas are not the everyday situations that participants will
encounter (Turiel, 2006, 2008b), assessing moral judgments
with these dilemmas is advantageous. The advantage is that
participants must make judgments without previous experience.
Thus, these unfamiliar dilemmas can better assess participants’
genuine moral judgments. In addition, there is an obviously
desirable orientation of moral judgments in previous studies.
For example, canceling a party to help an injured person is
the correct choice for most people. However, in the trolley
dilemmas, both choices seem reasonable. One of them is not
more socially acceptable than the other. Accordingly, the social
desirability effect can be better reduced. Finally, empirical studies
have confirmed that both children and adults can understand the
trolley-like dilemmas (Bleske-Rechek et al., 2010; Pellizzoni et al.,
2010). Therefore, the trolley-like dilemmas were used to assess
moral judgments in the present study. With regard to prosocial
behavior, participants’ helping behavior was measured through
their actual interaction with the experimenter. This experimental
paradigm has been administered to both children and adults
(Rubin and Schneider, 1973; Gino and Desai, 2012).
There are parallels between the cognitive and behavioral
measures of morality. First, both measures reflect individual
differences in morality. Individuals differ in whether they make
deontological moral judgments and the extent to which they
make this judgment. Individuals also differ in whether they
display helping behavior and the extent to which they help
others. Second, the two measures reflect similar characteristics
of moral development. The trolley-like dilemmas do not just
involve harming or not harming others. They also involve the
decision of whether to harm an innocent person even if more
people will be saved. Individuals’ choices of protecting the
person reflect their respect for the equality of people’s rights and
personal dignity according to Kohlberg’s (1976) theory. Similarly,
individuals’ prosocial behavior reflects their caring about others.
Third, the opposite choice in both measures is not absolutely
wrong. Thus, the trolley-like dilemmas and helping behavior
experiment were used to assess moral judgments and prosocial
behavior, respectively.
Several hypotheses were proposed in the present study. First,
there were specific developmental trends in theory of mind,
moral judgments, and prosocial behavior frommiddle childhood
to adulthood. This hypothesis indicates, to a certain extent,
that theory of mind may not be associated with morality in
an unchanging way throughout development. Second, moral
judgments continued to be associated with theory of mind
during development. Third, theory of mind and proscial behavior
were positively related in middle childhood but negatively
related in adolescence. The relationships between theory of mind
and prosocial behavior disappeared in adulthood. Supporting
evidence for these hypotheses will help to enrich the rationalistic
theories of morality from a developmental perspective.
METHODS
Participants
A total of 204 participants were recruited from several
communities in Beijing. Group 1 comprised 48 elementary
school children (27 males and 21 females) ranging in age from
8.04 to 10.59 years (M = 9.08, SD= 0.67). Group 2 comprised 45
adolescents (19 males and 26 females) ranging in age from 13.14
to 15.36 years (M = 14.00, SD= 0.62). They attended junior high
schools. Group 3 consisted of 62 younger adults (26 males and
36 females) ranging in age from 18.55 to 24.06 years (M = 20.41,
SD = 1.07). They were undergraduate students. Group 4 were
49 older adults (25 males and 24 females) ranging in age from
60.12 to 70.13 years (M = 62.73, SD = 2.61). The older adults
were asked to report their education level using the following
education brackets (1 = elementary school; 2 = junior high
school; 3 = senior high school; 4 = university). Eight of them
have elementary school education, fourteen complete junior high
school education, sixteen reach senior high school education, and
ten have achieved university education. The study was approved
by the Research Ethics Board of Department of Psychology
of Capital Normal University. Informed written consent was
obtained from all of the participants.
Measures and Procedure
Theory of Mind
The strange stories (Happé, 1994) were used to measure
participants’ theory of mind. The five stories involved the
understanding of a lie, a white lie, a double bluff, irony, and
persuasion.Minor revisions weremade based on Chinese culture.
First, “Christmas” was revised to “birthday” in the white lie story.
Second, the original names of the protagonists were revised to
Chinese names. The participants were tested individually in a
quiet room. According to Happé’s (1994) procedure, each story
was read aloud to the participants. Simultaneously, the story
and its illustration were also presented to the participants to
eliminate memory load. After reading the story, the experimenter
asked the participants the test question: “Why did X (name of
the protagonist) say that?” The order of the story presentation
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was randomized. The following is the double bluff story and the
corresponding test question:
During the war, the Red army captured a member of the Blue
army. They want him to tell them where his army’s tanks are;
they know they are either by the sea or in the mountains. They
know that the prisoner will not want to tell them, he will want
to save his army, and so he will certainly lie to them. The
prisoner is very brave and very clever, he will not let them find
his tanks. The tanks are really in the mountains. Now when
the other side asks him where his tanks are, he says, “They are
in the mountains” (Happé, 1994, p. 150).
Why did the prisoner say what he said? (Happé, 1994, p. 150).
According to the scoring in Happé et al. (1998), answers that
fully and explicitly mentioned the correct mental states received
a score of 2. Answers that partially and implicitly mentioned
the correct mental states were scored 1. Incorrect answers were
scored 0. Thus, the score for each story ranged from 0 to 2. The
total theory of mind score ranged from 0 to 10. The answers of
20% of the participants were scored by another rater who did
not know the purpose of the study. The kappa coefficients for
the lie, white lie, double bluff, irony, and persuasion stories were
0.81, 0.88, 0.85, 0.82, and 0.82, respectively. Thus the inter-rater
reliability was good.
Moral Judgments
The moral dilemmas in Hauser et al. (2007) were used to
assess the participants’ moral judgments. There were four moral
dilemmas, which were aimed at measuring the participants’
utilitarian or deontological moral judgments. In these dilemmas,
the participants had to decide whether to harm one person
to save five people. However, some differences existed in these
dilemmas. Moral dilemma 1 was the classic trolley dilemma. In
this dilemma, a runaway train could be diverted to a side track
so that five people on the main track could be saved. However,
one person standing on the side track would be killed. Moral
dilemma 2 was the classic footbridge dilemma. In this dilemma,
one large person with a backpack could be pushed off a footbridge
to stop a runaway train under the footbridge. Five people on the
track would survive, but the large person would die. Hauser et al.
(2007) noted that differences in participants’ responses to the two
dilemmas could be attributed to several effects. For example, they
were likely to reflect the contact principle or the principle of the
double effect. The contact principle emphasizes that harm with
physical contact is less permissible than harm without physical
contact (Cushman et al., 2006). The principle of the double effect
underlines that it is less acceptable to harm a person to save
more people when the harm is an intended means of saving
people rather than a side effect (Kamm, 1998). Therefore, moral
dilemmas 3 and 4 were designed to clarify the above possibilities.
They differed only in whether harm was used as an intended
means of saving five people. In moral dilemma 3, one person on
a side track could be intentionally hit by a runaway train through
a switch to slow down the train. As a result, five people on the
main track would have time to escape, but the person on the side
track would die. Moral dilemma 3 was thus termed the trolley
dilemma-means. In moral dilemma 4, a heavy object on a side
track could be hit by a runaway train through a switch to slow
down the train. Five people on the main track would have time
to escape, but one person in front of the heavy object would be
killed by accident. Moral dilemma 4 was thus termed the trolley
dilemma-side effect.
Minor revisions were made to the four moral dilemmas. The
original names of the protagonists were changed to Chinese
names. The participants were tested individually in a quiet
room. Each moral story was read aloud to the participants.
The story and its illustration were also presented to them. This
procedure guaranteed participants’ better understanding of the
moral dilemmas (Hao et al., 2015). At the end of each story,
the participants were asked two test questions. First, they were
asked to indicate whether it was morally permissible for the
protagonist to harm one person to save more people. Second,
they were asked to indicate the extent to which they advocated or
opposed harming the person on a rating scale from 1 (very much
morally impermissible) to 6 (very much morally permissible).
The order of the story presentation was randomized. Finally,
participants were also asked their justifications for their choices.
All the participants including the children could give reasonable
justifications. Children who advocated taking action generally
explained that five people would be saved. Children who opposed
taking action generally explained that it was immoral to kill
the lone person or the person was innocent. In addition, these
trolley-like dilemmas have been successfully used in assessing
moral judgments in preschool children aged 3–5 years (Pellizzoni
et al., 2010) and elementary school children aged 9–10 years
(Bucciarelli, 2015). It thus indicated that all the participants
including the children could understand these dilemmas. The
following is the trolley dilemma-classic:
Trolley dilemma-classic
Wang Dong is a passenger on a train whose driver has just
shouted that the train’s brakes have failed, and who then fainted
of the shock. On the track ahead are five people; the banks are
so steep that they will not be able to get off the track in time. The
track has a side track leading off to the right, and Wang Dong
can turn the train onto it. Unfortunately there is one person on
the right hand track. Wang Dong can turn the train, killing the
one; or she can refrain from turning the train, letting the five die
(Hauser et al., 2007, p. 18).
Is it morally permissible for Wang Dong to switch the train to
the side track? (Hauser et al., 2007, p. 18).
Please choose from 1 (very much morally impermissible),
2 (moderately morally impermissible), 3 (slightly morally
impermissible), 4 (slightly morally permissible), 5 (moderately
morally permissible), and 6 (very much morally permissible).
The deontological principle emphasizes that moral rules must
be abided by regardless of the consequences (Kant, 1959).
Therefore, judgments that it was morally impermissible to
harm the innocent person were scored 1. The opposite
judgments were scored 0. Meanwhile, the permissibility rating
was reverse-scored: a higher rating indicated that the participants
thought that it was more morally impermissible to harm
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the innocent person. In other words, the participants made
deontological moral judgments to a greater extent.
Prosocial Behavior
Gino and Desai’s (2012) experimental paradigm was used to
measure the participants’ helping behavior. After the participants
had spent some time on the theory of mind and moral judgment
tasks, a helping request was made by the experimenter. The
experimenter explained that another participant had been invited
to take part in a survey, but the person was temporarily
unavailable. The experimenter asked the participants whether
they were willing to help with the extra task. The survey involved
ten questions regarding decision making. The experimenter
emphasized that whether to help and the number of questions
with which the participant helped were completely voluntary.
Thus, participants were asked two questions. The first question
was “Are you willing to help me?” The question was intended
to make sure that the participants understood the voluntary
task. All the participants clearly expressed their willingness or
unwillingness to help. If they did not want to help, the survey
was skipped. If they were willing to help, they were then asked
the second question “How many questions are you willing to
answer?” All the volunteers answered the corresponding number
of questions as they promised. Finally, the participants were
debriefed. The helping behavior was scored 1, and the opposite
behavior was scored 0. In addition, the number of questions with
which the participants helped was recorded.
RESULTS
Performance on the Theory of Mind, Moral
Judgment, and Prosocial Behavior Tasks
Performance on the Theory of Mind Task
The four age groups’ performance on the theory of mind task
was compared. The mean score of each age group by theory of
mind story type is shown in Figure 1A. ANOVAswere conducted
to examine group differences in the understanding of various
mental states. There was a significant effect of age group on
the lie story, F(3, 199) = 3.74, p = 0.012, η
2
= 0.053. The post
hoc Bonferroni test found that the older adults’ scores were
significantly lower than the younger adults’ scores, p = 0.011.
The effect of age group failed to reach significance for the white
lie story, F(3, 200) = 1.67, p = 0.175, η
2
= 0.024. For the double
bluff story, the effect of age group was significant, F(3, 200) = 3.35,
p = 0.020, η2 = 0.048. The post hoc Bonferroni test showed
that the children’s scores were marginally significantly lower
than those of the younger adults, p = 0.061. A similar age
effect was found for the irony story, F(3, 200) = 8.57, p < 0.001,
η
2
= 0.114. The post hoc Bonferroni test confirmed that the
scores of the younger adults were significantly or marginally
significantly higher than those of the children (p < 0.001), the
adolescents (p = 0.054), and the older adults (p = 0.026). There
was also a significant effect of age group on the persuasion story,
F(3, 200) = 3.30, p= 0.021, η
2
= 0.047, but the post hoc Bonferroni
test did not yield significant differences among the groups.
The mean total theory of mind score of each age group is
shown in Figure 1B. An ANOVA indicated a significant effect
of age group, F(3, 199) = 10.41, p < 0.001, η
2
= 0.136. The post
hoc Bonferroni test demonstrated that the children’s scores were
significantly lower than those of the adolescents (p = 0.018) and
the younger adults (p < 0.001). The adolescents’ scores were
marginally significantly higher than the older adults’, p = 0.091.
The younger adults outperformed the older adults, p< 0.001. The
overall results reveal a smooth, inverted U-shaped trend in theory
of mind development.
Performance on the Moral Judgment Task
The four age groups’ performance on the moral dilemmas was
analyzed. The percentage of participants in each age group
judging that it was morally impermissible to harm the innocent
person by dilemma type is shown in Figure 2A. Chi-square tests
were performed to examine group differences in the percentage.
In the trolley dilemma-classic, the percentages were significantly
different among the age groups, χ2
(3, N = 204)
= 9.92, p =
0.019. Higher percentages of adolescents and younger adults
considered harming the innocent person morally impermissible.
Group differences in the percentage were also significant for the
footbridge dilemma-classic [χ2
(3, N = 204)
= 51.59, p < 0.001],
trolley dilemma-means [χ2
(3, N = 204)
= 31.73, p < 0.001] and
trolley dilemma-side effect [χ2
(3, N = 204)
= 21.88, p < 0.001].
Higher percentages of younger adults made deontological moral
judgments in these moral dilemmas. The percentage data show a
sharp, inverted U-shaped trend in deontological moral judgment
development.
In addition, the participants’ performance on the trolley
dilemma-classic and footbridge dilemma-classic was compared.
McNemar tests indicated that in each age group, a higher
percentage of participants judged that it was more morally
impermissible to harm the innocent person in the footbridge
dilemma-classic than in the trolley dilemma-classic (children:
p= 0.031, adolescents: p< 0.001; younger adults: p< 0.001; older
adults: p < 0.001). The results were probably due to the physical
contact or harm as an intended means in the classic footbridge
dilemma. However, the percentage of participants who judged
that it was morally impermissible to harm the innocent person
in the trolley dilemma-means was similar to that in the trolley
dilemma-side effect for each age group (McNemar test, children:
p= 1.000, adolescents: p= 1.000; younger adults: p= 0.754; older
adults: p= 0.500). It is thus suggested that the different responses
to the classic trolley and footbridge dilemmas in each age group
are attributable to the principle of physical contact rather than
the principle of double effect.
The mean rating of the moral permissibility of harming the
innocent person in each age group by dilemma type is shown in
Figure 2B. Higher ratings represent greater impermissibility. A 4
(age group)× 2 (trolley dilemma-classic vs. footbridge dilemma-
classic) repeated measures ANOVA indicated a significant
interaction effect [F(3, 200)= 14.15, p< 0.001, η
2
= 0.175], a main
effect of age group [F(3, 200) = 15.63, p < 0.001, η
2
= 0.190] and
a main effect of dilemma type [F(1, 200) = 119.72, p < 0.001, η
2
= 0.374]. Simple effect analysis was then performed. First, the
effect of age group on permissibility rating was tested for the
different dilemmas. In the trolley dilemma-classic, the effect of
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FIGURE 1 | Performance on the theory of mind task. (A) The mean score of each age group by theory of mind story type. (B) The mean total theory of mind
score of each age group. Error bars represent standard error.
FIGURE 2 | Performance on the moral judgment task. (A) The percentage of participants in each age group judging that it was morally impermissible to harm the
innocent person by dilemma type. (B) The mean rating of the moral permissibility of harming the innocent person in each group by dilemma type. Higher ratings
represent greater impermissibility. Error bars represent standard error.
age group was significant, F(3, 200) = 6.61, p< 0.001, η
2
= 0.090.
The post hoc Bonferroni test showed that compared with the
older adults, the adolescents and younger adults judged that it
was more impermissible to harm the innocent person, p= 0.001,
p = 0.002, respectively. In the footbridge dilemma-classic, there
was also a significant effect of age group, F(3, 200) = 20.90,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.239. The post hoc Bonferroni test showed
that the adolescents and the younger adults considered the
harmful action more impermissible than the children, p= 0.001,
p < 0.001, respectively. The younger adults did not accept the
harmful action to a greater extent compared with the adolescents
(p = 0.008) and the older adults (p < 0.001). Second, the effect
of dilemma type on permissibility rating in each age group was
analyzed. Participants in each age group except the children
[t(47) = 1.34, p = 0.188] thought that it was more impermissible
to harm the innocent person in the footbridge dilemma-classic
than in the trolley dilemma-classic [adolescents: t(44) = 4.59,
p < 0.001; younger adults: t(61) = 11.31, p < 0.001; older adults:
t(48) = 5.12, p < 0.001]. Whether the contact principle explains
the significant results for the three groups needs to be clarified
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by further comparing their performance on the trolley dilemma-
means and trolley dilemma-side effect.
A 4 (age groups) × 2 (trolley dilemma-means vs. trolley
dilemma-side effect) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted.
There was no significant interaction effect, F(3, 200) = 0.04,
p = 0.991, η2 = 0.001. The absence of a main effect of dilemma
type [F(1, 200) = 0.03, p = 0.868, η
2
< 0.001] meant that the
participants made similar moral judgments in the two dilemmas.
The main effect of age group was significant, F(3, 200) = 17.71,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.210. The post hoc Bonferroni test illustrated
that the harming action was judged more impermissible for the
adolescents and the younger adults compared to the children
(p = 0.015, p < 0.001, respectively) and the older adults
(p = 0.002, p < 0.001, respectively). On the whole, the
permissibility rating data also reveal a sharp, inverted U-shaped
trend in deontological moral judgments from middle childhood
to late adulthood. Moreover, the contact principle rather than
the principle of the double effect explains the participants’
different moral judgments in the classic trolley and footbridge
dilemmas.
Performance on the Prosocial Behavior Task
Performance on the helping behavior experiment in each age
group was compared. The percentage of participants in each
age group displaying helping behaviors is shown in Figure 3A.
A chi-square test found that the percentages were significantly
different among the age groups, χ2
(3, N = 204)
= 14.81, p = 0.002.
Higher percentages of children and adolescents provided help.
The extent to which the participants helped was then analyzed.
Themean number of questions with which each age group helped
is shown in Figure 3B. An ANOVA indicated that there was
a significant effect of age group, F(3, 200) = 3.87, p = 0.010,
η
2
= 0.055. The post hoc Bonferroni test found that the children
helped with more questions than the younger and older adults,
p = 0.032 and p = 0.013, respectively. In sum, a linear decline in
helping behavior seems to occur from middle childhood to late
adulthood.
Development Trends in Theory of Mind,
Moral Judgments, and Prosocial Behavior
Group difference analyses imply that there may be specific
developmental trajectories in theory of mind, moral judgments,
and prosocial behavior. Polynomial trend analyses were
conducted to further confirm this inference. In the polynomial
trend analyses, the trends that theory of mind, moral judgments,
and prosocial behavior varied with age groups were tested. The
trends were tested to indicate whether they followed a linear,
a quadratic or a cubic trend. The results showed significant
age-related quadratic trends in the understanding of white
lies (contrast estimate = −0.25, p = 0.031), double bluffs
(contrast estimate=−0.32, p= 0.002), and persuasion (contrast
estimate = −0.25, p = 0.002). A significant cubic trend in the
understanding of lies was found, contrast estimate = −0.20, p =
0.009. For the understanding of irony, the linear and quadratic
trends were all significant (linear: contrast estimate = 0.25,
p = 0.007; quadratic: contrast estimate = −0.32, p = 0.001).
Moreover, there was a significant quadratic developmental trend
in theory of mind as a whole, contrast estimate = −1.28, p <
0.001. In sum, the results indicate a generally quadratic trend
in theory of mind development from middle childhood to late
adulthood.
With regard to moral judgments, the permissibility rating data
demonstrated a significant linear (contrast estimate = − 0.43, p
= 0.030) and quadratic (contrast estimate = −0.75, p < 0.001)
trend in deontological moral judgment development in the
trolley dilemma-classic. The linear (contrast estimate = 0.75,
p = 0.002), quadratic (contrast estimate = −1.52, p < 0.001),
and cubic (contrast estimate = −0.54, p = 0.020) trends were
all significant for the footbridge dilemma-classic. Deontological
moral judgments in the trolley dilemma-means displayed a
significant quadratic (contrast estimate = −1.14, p < 0.001)
and cubic trend (contrast estimate = −0.44, p = 0.015).
Significant quadratic (contrast estimate = −1.16, p < 0.001) and
cubic (contrast estimate = −0.40, p = 0.047) trends were also
obtained for the trolley dilemma-side effect. On the whole, the
FIGURE 3 | Performance on the prosocial behavior task. (A) The percentage of participants in each age group displaying helping behavior. (B) The mean
number of questions with which each age group helped. Error bars represent standard error.
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developmental trajectory of deontological moral judgments is
complex, showing a combination of quadratic and cubic trends.
Finally, a significant linear decline existed in the number of
questions with which participants helped, contrast estimate =
−1.88, p= 0.001. Thus, prosocial behavior linearly declines from
middle childhood to late adulthood.
Relationships between Theory of Mind,
Moral Judgments, and Prosocial Behavior
The trend analyses confirm that theory of mind, moral
judgments, and prosocial behavior have their own specific
developmental trajectories. Thus, theory of mind may not
be associated with morality in an unchanging way during
development. Partial correlation analyses were carried out
between theory of mind and morality variables for each age
group. The results are shown in Tables 1–5.
There were some significant correlations between theory
of mind and deontological moral judgments in each age
group. The children’s understanding of lies was significantly
negatively correlated with whether they made deontological
moral judgments in the trolley dilemma-classic (r = −0.35, p =
0.016), the degree of their deontological moral judgments in the
trolley dilemma-classic (r = −0.29, p = 0.045), and footbridge
dilemma-classic (r = −0.40, p = 0.006). The adolescents’
understanding of lies was significantly negatively correlated
with whether they made deontological moral judgments in the
trolley dilemma-means (r = −0.42, p = 0.005) and trolley
dilemma-side effect (r = −0.41, p = 0.006). There was also
a significant negative correlation between the adolescents’ total
theory of mind scores and whether they made deontological
moral judgments in the trolley dilemma-means, r = −0.32, p
= 0.035. However, the younger adults’ understanding of double
bluffs was significantly positively correlated with whether they
made deontological moral judgments in the trolley dilemma-
classic, r = 0.31, p = 0.017. For the older adults, their
understanding of lies had a significant negative correlation
with whether they made deontological moral judgments in
the trolley dilemma-means, r = −0.35, p = 0.018. The
results indicate that individuals with better theory of mind
are less likely to make deontological moral judgments in
middle childhood and adolescence. In other words, they are
more likely to make utilitarian moral judgments. Nevertheless,
better theory of mind is related to more deontological
moral judgments in early adulthood. In late adulthood, the
relationships between theory of mind and moral judgments
resemble those in middle childhood and adolescence. These
results reveal that theory of mind and moral judgments are
both positively and negatively associated during development.
These relationships exist from middle childhood to late
adulthood.
Some significant correlations between theory of mind and
helping behavior were found in the children and adolescents.
The children’s understanding of persuasion was significantly
positively correlated with whether they helped (r = 0.33, p
= 0.026). A similar relationship was found between their
understanding of double bluffs and the degree of their
helping behavior (r = 0.33, p = 0.026). However, the
degree of the adolescents’ helping behavior was significantly
negatively correlated with their total theory of mind scores
(r = −0.38, p = 0.013), understanding of white lies (r =
−0.55, p < 0.001), and understanding of irony (r = −0.33,
p = 0.032). For the younger and older adults, there were no
significant correlations between theory of mind and helping
behavior. Therefore, theory of mind and prosocial behavior are
both positively and negatively associated during development.
Moreover, the relationships between the two disappear in
adulthood.
DISCUSSION
Theory of mind has been considered an important facilitator
of moral development. The present study enriches this view
and confirms that from a developmental perspective, a mind-
reader does not always have deontological moral judgments
and prosocial behavior. The results found that theory of
mind, moral judgments, and prosocial behavior had their
TABLE 1 | Partial correlations between theory of mind and morality variables for children.
Variables Lie White lie Double bluff Irony Persuasion Total theory of mind
Trolley-classic 1 −0.35* −0.17 −0.17 −0.12 0.14 −0.25†
Trolley-classic 2 −0.29* −0.08 −0.25† −0.01 −0.10 −0.27†
Footbridge-classic 1 −0.27† 0.15 0.02 0.01 0.15 0.04
Footbridge-classic 2 −0.40** 0.15 0.05 0.10 0.00 −0.10
Trolley-means 1 −0.02 −0.07 0.11 0.09 0.25† 0.11
Trolley-means 2 −0.22 −0.08 0.08 0.12 0.17 0.01
Trolley-side effect 1 0.01 −0.08 0.00 0.04 0.26† 0.06
Trolley-side effect 2 −0.16 −0.07 0.06 0.09 0.26† 0.05
Helping behavior 1 −0.10 0.07 0.06 0.16 0.33* 0.17
Helping behavior 2 −0.18 0.13 0.33* 0.07 0.14 0.20
Partial correlations controlling age were calculated for children. For each moral dilemma, 1 represents judgments about whether it is morally permissible to harm the innocent person (Yes
= 0, No = 1); 2 represents ratings of the moral permissibility of harming the innocent person. Higher ratings represent greater impermissibility. Helping behavior 1 represents whether
helping behavior is displayed (Yes = 1, No = 0). Helping behavior 2 represents the number of questions with which the participants help.
†
p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
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TABLE 2 | Partial correlations between theory of mind and morality variables for adolescents.
Variables Lie White lie Double bluff Irony Persuasion Total theory of mind
Trolley-classic 1 0.04 0.01 −0.14 0.04 −0.13 −0.07
Trolley-classic 2 0.13 0.02 −0.06 0.04 0.00 0.05
Footbridge-classic 1 −0.10 0.06 −0.02 0.07 −0.18 −0.06
Footbridge-classic 2 −0.03 0.07 0.00 0.12 −0.08 0.03
Trolley-means 1 −0.42** −0.03 −0.14 0.09 −0.29† −0.32*
Trolley-means 2 −0.20 0.11 −0.10 0.00 −0.20 −0.15
Trolley-side effect 1 −0.41** 0.12 −0.29† 0.27† −0.29† −0.25
Trolley-side effect 2 −0.21 0.27† −0.20 0.22 −0.13 −0.03
Helping behavior 1 −0.12 −0.22 −0.06 −0.24 −0.03 −0.26†
Helping behavior 2 0.04 −0.55*** −0.10 −0.33* −0.02 −0.38*
Partial correlations controlling age were calculated for adolescents.
†
p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
TABLE 3 | Partial correlations between theory of mind and morality variables for younger adults.
Variables Lie White lie Double bluff Irony Persuasion Total theory of mind
Trolley-classic 1 0.04 −0.04 0.31* −0.06 0.07 0.11
Trolley-classic 2 0.13 0.00 0.21 −0.09 0.13 0.09
Footbridge-classic 1 −0.06 −0.05 0.14 −0.10 0.00 −0.01
Footbridge-classic 2 0.09 −0.08 0.11 −0.09 0.04 −0.01
Trolley-means 1 0.11 −0.02 −0.11 −0.03 0.08 −0.04
Trolley-means 2 0.02 −0.03 −0.01 −0.05 0.12 0.00
Trolley-side effect 1 0.10 0.04 −0.01 0.01 0.08 0.04
Trolley-side effect 2 0.02 −0.01 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.04
Helping behavior 1 −0.07 0.03 0.21 0.06 −0.03 0.11
Helping behavior 2 0.14 0.04 0.08 0.10 −0.07 0.08
Partial correlations controlling age were calculated for younger adults. *p < 0.05.
TABLE 4 | Partial correlations between theory of mind and morality variables for older adults.
Variables Lie White lie Double bluff Irony Persuasion Total theory of mind
Trolley-classic 1 −0.14 −0.10 −0.14 0.08 0.00 −0.13
Trolley-classic 2 −0.05 −0.08 0.03 0.21 −0.08 0.01
Footbridge-classic 1 0.06 −0.16 0.06 0.22 0.02 0.06
Footbridge-classic 2 0.07 −0.07 0.05 0.16 −0.01 0.07
Trolley-means 1 −0.35* −0.04 −0.07 0.02 0.05 −0.16
Trolley-means 2 −0.23 −0.07 0.05 0.01 0.05 −0.08
Trolley-side effect 1 −0.26† 0.00 −0.22 0.11 −0.03 −0.15
Trolley-side effect 2 −0.14 −0.10 −0.11 0.14 −0.12 −0.13
Helping behavior 1 0.09 0.12 0.23 0.00 −0.07 0.17
Helping behavior 2 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.06 0.04 0.28†
Partial correlations controlling age and education level were calculated for older adults.
†
p < 0.10, *p < 0.05.
own specific developmental trends. Thus, theory of mind
seems not to be associated with morality in an unchanging
way throughout development. Further results confirmed that
theory of mind and deontological moral judgments were
negatively related in middle childhood, adolescence, and late
adulthood but were positively associated in early adulthood.
Theory of mind and prosocial behavior were positively
related in middle childhood but were negatively associated
in adolescence. However, the relationships disappeared in
adulthood.
The group difference and developmental trend analyses
showed that theory of mind and each aspect of morality
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TABLE 5 | Summaries of the relationships between theory of mind and morality during development.
Middle childhood Adolescence Early adulthood Late adulthood
Theory of mind and deontological moral judgments Negative relationships Negative relationships Positive relationships Negative relationships
Theory of mind and helping behavior Positive relationships Negative relationships No relationship No relationship
The summaries are based on the significant correlations between theory of mind variables and morality variable for each age group.
followed their own specific developmental trajectories. There
was generally a quadratic developmental trend in theory of
mind that presented a smooth, inverted U-shaped trajectory.
Previous studies have reported a similar developmental trend,
indicating that theory of mind increases from middle childhood
to adolescence (Scheeren et al., 2013) and then declines from
early to late adulthood (Bernstein et al., 2011; Rakoczy et al., 2012;
Henry et al., 2013). Deontological moral judgments generally
displayed a more complex developmental trend, which was a
combination of quadratic and cubic curves. This developmental
trajectory was more like a sharp, inverted U-shaped curve.
Therefore, moral judgments seem to change substantially from
middle childhood to late adulthood. These findings are consistent
with previous theory and results. According to the cognitive-
developmental theory, moral judgments mature with age, and
the final postconventional level is reached in early adulthood
(Colby and Kohlberg, 1987). When entering into late adulthood,
individuals’ moral perspective taking declines over time (Pratt
et al., 1996). Moreover, the present study found that the younger
adults made deontological moral judgments to a greater extent
than other age groups, who were inclined to make more
utilitarian moral judgments. At the postconventional level, the
equality of people’s rights and personal dignity is respected
(Kohlberg, 1976). Younger adults might think that it was not
fair to sacrifice one life to save five; thus, they chose to protect
the innocent person. However, there were also some similarities
among age groups in moral judgments. The overall results
showed that almost all the age groups made similar moral
judgments in the trolley dilemma-means and trolley dilemma-
side effect but different moral judgments in the trolley dilemma-
classic and footbridge dilemma-classic. As a result, the principle
of physical contact rather than the principle of the double effect
guided their moral judgments. Pellizzoni et al. (2010) also found
the contact principle in both young children and adults. Finally,
there was a linear decline in helping behavior from middle
childhood to late adulthood. Previous studies have shown that
sharing or donating behavior increases between the ages of 4
and 8 years (Ongley and Malti, 2014; Ongley et al., 2014) and
then declines between the ages of 8 and 12 years, especially for
boys (Ongley and Malti, 2014). High levels of proscoial behavior
in middle childhood may be related to children’s increasing
abilities to decenter (Rubin and Schneider, 1973). In short, the
specific developmental trajectories of theory of mind, moral
judgments, and prosocial behavior imply that reasoning ability
in the mental domain may not be consistently associated with
morality in an unchanging way during development. There may
be multiple relationships between this reasoning ability and
morality.
The correlation analyses further confirmed this inference.
Theory of mind and deontological moral judgments were
negatively associated for children, adolescents and older adults
but positively associated for younger adults. Smetana et al. (2012)
also demonstrated that theory of mind had both positive and
negative influences on preschoolers’ moral judgments during
different developmental intervals. According to Kohlberg’s moral
development levels, children at the preconventional level value
external rules such as consequences; social systems are important
for adolescents at the conventional level; and younger adults at
the postconventional level begin to consider abstract principles
(Nisan and Kohlberg, 1982; Colby and Kohlberg, 1987; Kohlberg,
2008). During different developmental stages, individuals’ social
experiences may explain their corresponding moral development
levels. School experiences may make children and adolescents
place greater consideration on the good for the majority of
people. Wide social interaction may enable the younger adults
to consider multiple perspectives of fairness rather than the
apparent fairness. Therefore, there may be different perspectives
on fairness for different age groups. Harming one person to
save five people is fair for children and adolescents in terms of
consequences and the social system, but protecting the innocent
person is fair for younger adults in terms of ethical principles.
Because theory of mind may give rise to inequality aversion
(Fehr et al., 2008), individuals with better theory of mind are
more likely to make fair choices. In the present study, children
and adolescents with better theory of mind thus made less
deontological judgments, whereas younger adults made more
deontological judgments. As for older adults, some studies find
a regression of their moral judgments (Del Vento Bielby and
Papalia, 1975), but others find little change in moral judgments
from middle to late adulthood (Pratt et al., 1991). When entering
into the late adulthood, individuals’ social interaction becomes
limited. Their reasoning regarding interpersonal situations tends
toward simplicity (Pratt et al., 1996). Thus, in the present
study, the older adults might simply consider apparent fairness,
believing that saving more people was fair despite the sacrifice
of one person. In other words, they preferred less deontological
judgments. The relationships between theory of mind and
deontological moral judgment in them were thus negative, as was
explained for children and adolescents. In addition, the present
study showed that the understanding of lies and double bluffs was
closely related to deontological moral judgments. These results
were not by accident. Cognitive and affective theory of mind have
been differentiated in previous studies (Bodden et al., 2013; Kim
et al., 2016). The former involves the understanding of beliefs and
intentions, and the latter involves the understanding of emotions
and feelings (Wang and Su, 2013). In the present study, the lie,
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double bluffs, and persuasion stories focused on the inference of
cognitive states, whereas the white lie and irony stories focused
on the inference of emotional states. Fehr et al. (2008) proposed
that individuals with better theory of mind might care more
about what others thought about them. Therefore, individuals
with better understanding of cognitive states may be good at
inference of others’ perspectives of their choice in the trolley-
like dilemmas and make more acceptable moral judgments.
Neuroimaging studies also indicate that inference of cognitive
states such as beliefs and intentions is important for moral
judgment (Young and Dungan, 2012). Furthermore, theory of
mind was found to be associated with moral judgments in
specific moral dilemmas for specific age groups. Because all of
the age groups except the children generally thought that it
was more impermissible to directly harm a person in any case,
there were no relationships between theory of mind and moral
judgments in the footbridge dilemma-classic in these groups.
According to Piaget’s (1965) stages of moral development, after
the age of 10, individuals enter a stage of autonomous morality,
placing greater consideration on intentions and motives. Thus,
in the present study, adolescents and older adults were more
sensitive to the trolley dilemma-means and trolley dilemma-
side effect, which clearly involved intentional or unintentional
harm. For the younger adults, the trolley dilemma-classic might
implicitly induce grater consideration of intentions. For example,
participants mentioned that in the dilemma it was not necessary
to intentionally harm the lone person to save the five people
(Hauser et al., 2007). Thus, the younger adults were more
sensitive to the dilemma. In sum, the results indicate that theory
of mind may be a nice tool for its facilitation of deontological
moral judgments. It may also be a nasty tool for its blocking of
deontological moral judgments. Moreover, theory of mind may
be a permanent tool for moral judgment development.
The present study also investigated the relationships between
theory of mind and prosocial behavior during development.
Some studies have examined children’s spontaneous prosocial
behavior (Rubin and Schneider, 1973; Eisenberg-Berg and Hand,
1979). However, a number of studies have also focused on
children and adolescents’ response to requests to donate things or
complete extra tasks (Eisenberg et al., 1987, 1991, 1995; Ongley
et al., 2014). First, the paradigms of spontaneous prosocial
behavior rely on behavioral observation and lack experimental
control. Second, the experimenter who requested help in the
present paradigm was just a common stranger rather than
one of the children’s important others, such as a parent or a
teacher. Thus, the experimenter was not an authority figure
and children did not need to obey the experimenter. Third,
children were clearly told that they could skip the extra
task if they were not willing to help. Therefore, the present
experimental paradigm assessed genuine helping behavior. The
results showed that theory of mind was positively associated
with helping behavior for children but negatively related to
helping behavior for adolescents. Caputi et al. (2012) indicated
that theory of mind ultimately influenced peer relationships via
social behavior. Children’s prosocial tendencies are associated
with their popularity (Dekovic´ and Gerris, 1994; Greener, 2000;
Warden and Mackinnon, 2003), but specific antisocial behavior
is related to adolescents’ popularity (Cillessen and Borch, 2006;
Mayeux, 2014; Stoltz et al., 2016). Thus, children tended to use
theory of mind more prosocially, whereas adolescents tended
to use it less prosocially in the present study. These results are
consistent with the theory of nice and nasty theory of mind
to some extent (Happé and Frith, 1996; Ronald et al., 2005).
The present study also found that understanding of double
bluffs, persuasion, white lies and irony was related to helping
behavior. Individuals with good performance on double bluff and
persuasion stories could better understand others’ cognitive states
and thus grasp the experimenter’s intention to seek help to a
greater extent. Good performance on white lie and irony stories
reflected better understanding of emotional states. This would
help comprehend the experimenter’s anxiety about the absence of
the invited participant. However, whether to behave prosocially
after mental state reasoning depends on the developmental
characteristics, as stated above. In addition, the results showed
that the relationships between theory of mind and helping
behavior disappeared in adulthood. Novakova and Flegr (2013)
found that the more the amount at stake were, the less adults
wanted to share in the dictator and ultimatum games. The result
indicates that adults seem to be more like “homo economicus,”
considering the cost of prosocial behavior. Thus, adults as homo
economicus may not necessarily behave prosocially after they
infer others’ mental states. Their prosocial behavior may require
more affective motives. Hardy (2006) has proposed that “it is
moral emotion that provides the motivating “spark” that leads to
moral action” (p. 208). Studies on adults are consistent with the
affective mechanism, confirming the role of empathy in prosocial
behavior in adulthood (Sze et al., 2012; Lockwood et al., 2014;
Light et al., 2015). Therefore, the relationships between theory
of mind and helping behavior were not found in adults. In sum,
the results indicate that theory of mind may be a nice tool for
its facilitation of prosocial behavior. However, it may also be
a nasty tool for its blocking of prosocial behavior. Moreover,
theory of mind may be a temporary tool for prosocial behavior
development.
There are some limitations in the present study. First, the
strange story task was used in the present study because it
measures different aspects of theory of mind with stories of
similar format. More typical stories measuring cognitive and
affective theory of mind can be chosen in future studies.
For example, in addition to the five stories used in the
present study, second-order false belief stories can be used
to assess cognitive theory of mind, whereas faux pas stories
can be used to assess affective theory of mind (Wang and
Su, 2013). Second, the present study focuses on judgments
about right or wrong, i.e., evaluating whether it is morally
permissible to treat others in specific ways. Thus, the trolley-like
dilemmas were used to measure moral judgments and reduce
the social desirability effect. However, the trolley-like dilemmas
may not be familiar to children. Future studies focusing on
reasoning behind moral judgments can use everyday moral
dilemmas (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1983) to further examine
relationships between theory of mind and moral reasoning
during development. Because moral reasoning relies on internal
reasoning ability, the social desirability effect will be ruled
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 August 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1261
Hao and Liu Theory of Mind and Morality
out to some extent. Third, although there are some parallels
between measures of moral judgments and prosocial behavior
in the present study, an important distinction also exists
between the two measures. Moral judgments involve evaluating
what is morally permissible regarding how to treat others,
whereas prosocial behavior involves a positive but not obligatory
behavior. Thus, future studies can examine proscriptive behavior
(Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009), such as cheating behavior, to
make the cognitive and behavioral measures of morality more
parallel.
In addition, a high number of correlational analyses were
conducted to explore the relationships between theory of
mind and moral judgments and prosocial behavior during
development. Thus, the problem of inflation of type one error
may exist. The alpha level was not adjusted downwards because
this adjustment may be conservative for initial clarification of
the trends in relationships between theory of mind and morality
during development. Meanwhile, the adjustment may increase
the chance of making a type two error. However, the type one
error needs to be better control in future studies which aim to
further confirm the relationships between key theory of mind
variables and morality variables during development.
In conclusion, the present study indicates that reasoning
ability in the mental domain is not always beneficial to moral
development from middle childhood to late adulthood. This
reasoning ability may be a nice tool for its facilitation of
deontological moral judgments and prosocial behavior, but it
may also be a nasty tool for its blocking of deontological moral
judgments and prosocial behavior. It may be a permanent tool
for moral judgment development but a temporary tool for
prosocial behavior development. Thus, the present study enriches
the rationalistic theories of morality from a developmental
perspective.
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